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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON THE
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY
Federal courts traditionally have had the equitable power to relieve a prevailing party of attorney's fees by shifting this expense of
litigation to the losing party.' The decision to shift fees was entirely
discretionary with the court 2 unless either a private contractual
'This discussion refers to the so-called American rule governing awards of attorney's fees. Although the rule generally disallows a shift of fees from the prevailing party
to the losing party, a litigant may still be able to recover the expense of attorney's fees
under limited circumstances which are grouped into statutory and extra-statutory
exceptions. In the former situation, a statute either mandates an award or authorizes
a court to exercise its discretion in making an award. See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACIcE 54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1974). The extra-statutory exceptions permit a court to
exercise its equitable discretion and award fees "when the interests of justice so require." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
Before the development of the "private attorney general" theory, the two major
extra-statutory exceptions to the American rule were the "bad faith" and "common
fund" theories. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973). For a general discussion
of the interrelationship of the various theories see Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in
Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973).
Courts will shift fees in order to punish a litigant who has acted in bad faith, which
is defined as vexatious or unreasonable conduct designed to prolong the litigation. See,
e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). Bad faith has also been found
when the litigant's conduct necessitated the institution of litigation, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (Koelsch, J., concurring); Callahan v.
Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (N.D.
Miss.), aff'd, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss.
1969).
The common fund theory was developed to reimburse a plaintiff who had created
or preserved a monetary fund in which others would share. The fees were awarded from
the fund in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of those who had benefitted by the
litigation without incurring the expense, or undertaking the burden of bringing suit,
e.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). It was immaterial that the plaintiff
had not sued specifically on behalf of the class, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939). See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597 (1974).
An outgrowth of the common fund theory is the "common benefit" theory in which
plaintiff, on behalf of a class, has derived a benefit from the litigation which is not
amenable to pecuniary valuation. No fund has been created from which fees may be
assessed, so the fees are shifted to the defendant as the only alternative source of
payment, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Brewer v. School
Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
2
The reason advanced for making an award of fees an unusual rather than a regular
occurrence is that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant should be deterred from
bringing or defending a lawsuit by the prospect of paying both attorneys. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
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agreement or a statute mandated an award of fees. However, the
courts have recently recognized that in suits implementing important
congressional policies or vindicating federal constitutional provisions, 3 the prevailing party should be regularly relieved of attorney's
fees as a reward for acting as a "private attorney general." 4 A serious
conflict arises, however, when a private attorney general successfully
sues state officials. If the attorney's fees will be paid from state funds
the eleventh amendment,' which is designed to protect a state's treasury, may be invoked6 to prevent an award of fees, thereby frustrating
However, this justification has been severely criticized. The argument is that the
actual result of the American rule is to deny court access to those potential litigants
who cannot bear the initial expense of attorney's fees, or who cannot sustain payment
over a long period of time and consequently may be forced to forego lengthy litigation
due to the delaying tactics of a wealthier opponent. As an alternative to the American
rule, several commentators suggest that attorney's fees be included as part of the
taxable costs of litigation. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a
Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees:
Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967). For a discussion
of the opposing English practice in which attorney's fees are regularly taxed against
the losing party as costs, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
3
As the court stated in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972):
The rule briefly stated is that whenever there is nothing in a statutory
scheme which might be interpreted as precluding it, a "private
attorney-general" should be awarded attorneys' fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has benefited a large
class of people, and where further the necessity and financial burden
of private enforcement are such as to make the award essential.
Id. at 98 (citation omitted). Accord, Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974);
Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher,
366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Hawaii 1972).
4
The private attorney general exception to the American rule was introduced in
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See text accompanying
note 15 infra.
One commentator suggests that the only prerequisite for an award under the
private attorney general theory should be a decision by the court that fees will encourage litigation of a high national priority, and will allow access to the courts: "[T]he
only prerequisite for [the private attorney general theory's] application would be a
judicial determination that the suit involves questions of sufficient importance that
such encouragement and, therefore, such awards are desirable." Falcon, Award of
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation, 33 MD. L. REV. 379, 409
(1973). But see Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972) (Congress should
decide which suits are important enough to warrant a fee shift), rev'd on other grounds,
416 U.S. 696 (1974).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides in pertinent part: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State .... "
'See, e.g., Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974); Skehan v. Board of
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7
the need to encourage similar public interest litigation.
Despite protests that the eleventh amendment bars such relief,
several courts have shifted attorney's fees to losing state officials
although the award was at least implicitly to be paid from state
funds.8 In each case, the fees were construed as a reward to the plaintiff because he had performed a valuable public service by acting as
a private attorney general. However, the potential prohibition of fee
awards found in the eleventh amendment was revitalized following
the recent Supreme Court decision in Edelman v. Jordan.9 The Court
in Edelman held that an award of retroactive welfare payments, to
be paid from state funds, was equivalent to a legal recovery of damages and thus was conclusively barred by the eleventh amendment.' 0
In subsequent decisions, the Third" and Sixth' 2 Circuit Courts of
Appeals have extended the holding in Edelman to prohibit an award
of attorney's fees. Because of the importance of the suits which are
encouraged by a shift of attorney's fees based on the private attorney
general theory,'3 it is crucial to determine if the rationale of the

Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Undergraduate Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F.
Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970).
7
Whether attorney's fees which are awarded after the plaintiff has successfully
obtained declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible under Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), or are violative of the eleventh amendment depends on the proper
interpretation of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See text accompanying note
85 infra.
8See Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972);
Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d
885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973)- Taylor v. Perini, 359
F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aft'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1972), aft'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
'415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"Id. at 668-69.
"The Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the holding in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) foreclosed all monetary awards from a state treasury and
refused to shift fees to losing state officials under the private attorney general theory,
Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42-44 (3d Cir. 1974). See text accompanying
note 105 infra.
"The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that attorney's fees corresponded to
the test for damages enunciated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and were
therefore prohibited by the eleventh amendment, Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 70910 (6th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 111 infra.
"2Courts have construed the award as a means of encouraging pro bono publico
litigation, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th
Cir. 1971). In Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), the plaintiffs
were rewarded as private attorneys general, although they technically lost the suit,
because the litigation had benefitted the general public by forcing a more complete
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Edelman case actually supports a characterization of fees as an infringement upon a state's sovereign immunity as embodied in the
14
eleventh amendment.
The private attorney general theory was promulgated by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 5 which
involved an action brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.16 This statute permits a court to exercise its discretion in awarding fees to a party,17 but the Newman Court held that such a fee shift
was mandatory 8 unless unspecified "special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." 9 According to the Court, the factors
supporting the award included the plaintiff's role in vindicating an
important congressional policy, the need for private enforcement of
2
the statute,'
and the unavailability of a damages recovery from
compliance with the impact statement required by the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
"Although Congress cannot override a constitutional principle, it may already
have determined that an award of attorney's fees against a state does not violate the
eleventh amendment. The Emergency School Aid Act § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp.
II, 1972), provides in part: "Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United
States against a local educational agency, a State (or any agency thereof), . . . the
court, in its discretion,. . . may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's

fee as part of the costs." (Emphasis added). A reading of the statute suggests that the
award is to be made in the court's discretion after it has weighed all the relevant
circumstances including, presumably, any claim of sovereign immunity. However, in
Northcross v. Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court construed the statute in pari passu with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), and
extended the private attorney general theory, including its mandatory characteristic,
to the above-quoted statute. Accord, Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
5390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
"142 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970).
'142 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), provides in pertinent part: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .
"The Court stated:
A Title II suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an
action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an
injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority . .

.

.It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining

an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee . ...

390 U.S. at 401-02 (1968). The court in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 22
(N.D. Cal. 1973), suggested that the result in Newman reflected a decision to abrogate
the American rule governing attorney's fees.
l1390 U.S. at 402.
2
The need for private enforcement is illustrated by the fact that the Attorney
General may commence an action only if he certifies that it is of general public importance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970).
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which attorney's fees would normally be paid. The Court determined
that the presence of these three criteria mandated a shift of attorney's
fees in favor of the prevailing plaintiff in order to reward him for
initiating the suit, and as an incentive to encourage future plaintiffs
to vindicate federal statutory rights. 21 However, the equitable discretion of a court to weigh the various factors and to deny the fee request
was preserved by the reference in Newman to circumstances which
might militate against the award.2 2 Nevertheless, in a radical departure from the general American rule,2 3 the assumption now was that
plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general. would normally recover
24
attorney's fees from the losing party.
The private attorney general theory apparently filled a gap in the
remedies available to plaintiffs in public interest cases2 because the
lower federal courts quickly applied the theory to statutes which were
silent concerning an award of attorney's fees.28 This movement began
21

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
=In Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth
Circuit examined and rejected several suggestions which the defendants advanced as
facts constituting special circumstances and precluding a fee shift under Newman. The
defendants unsuccessfully contended that none of the defenses or issues they raised
had been frivolous; all of their arguments were meritorious and made in good faith;
and several judges during the course of the litigation had agreed with their position.
The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs were represented by a legal services
group and therefore had not expended the cost of attorney's fees. The Fifth Circuit, in
rejecting this latter contention, noted that only an attorney-client relationship was
required and that the court could pay the fees directly to the attorney. Several other
courts have agreed that outside financing does not militate against an award. See, e.g.,
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d
1331 (1st Cir. 1973). But see Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367 F.
Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973) (if defendant raises meritorious, good faith defenses, a fee
shift would be a punitive award when the plaintiff is not impecunious).
nSee note 1 supra.
"In Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit held that a
court which refuses to relieve a private attorney general of the expense of attorney's
fees must detail the reasons for the decision. Accord, Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852,
853 n.1 (1st Cir. 1972); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
2'See note 13 supra.
"In analyzing the expansive movement of the private attorney general theory from
its inception in Newman to statutes which are silent on an award of fees, the court in
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1973) stated: "While various
rationales have been given for including attorney's fees as costs, the courts are in
essence making a judgment that including attorney's fees as costs is an additional
remedy necessary to effectuate the congressional underpinnings of a substantial program." See also Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General".
JudicialGreen Light to PrivateLitigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 733
(1973).
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in Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.Y in which the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that § 198228 protected rights substantially similar to those
in the more recently enacted Fair Housing Act. 9 The Lee court held
that the detailed remedies outlined in the later statute, including the
provision for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, provided a guideline for appropriate remedies under the earlier, generalized statute.3 0 Finding that private enforcement was necessary, that
the plaintiff had effectuated a strong congressional policy, and that
damages were often unavailable under § 1982, the Lee court shifted
attorney's fees as a reward to the plaintiff for acting as a private
3
attorney general.
The lower federal courts subsequently extended the reasoning in
Lee and awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general under § 198132 and § 1983,' 3 holding in each case that
the silence of the statute was immaterial once the three criteria enunciated in Newman were found to be present. In addition, like the
Fifth Circuit in Lee, these courts incorporated the mandatory character of the award in applying the private attorney general theory to the
34
silent statutes.
-444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
-42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
"'42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). The related provision on attorney's fees permits the
court, in its discretion, to make an award once it has determined that the prevailing
party cannot bear the expense, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
"The court in Lee reasoned:
In adjudicating the shape of the remedies for violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, courts must give weight to the actions of Congress in enacting the sections of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Act
aimed at very similarly defined social problems ....

[Wihere the

older statutes are silent, and where the responsibility for fashioning
an effective remedy must be met by the courts, they should look to
the policies embodied in the remedial provisions of the more recent
statutes as a reference in shaping remedies to the needs of the older
statutes.
444 F.2d at 146 (citation omitted).
"Id. at 147-48. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
3242 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
-42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga.
1972); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971).
3
It is difficult to evaluate the Supreme Court's position concerning the extension
of the private attorney general theory to statutes which are silent on an award of
attorney's fees. In Northcross v. Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 429 n.2 (1973), the
Court explicitly refused to state an opinion concerning the validity of a fee shift absent
specific statutory authorization and referred to Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st
Cir. 1972), and Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). In the
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The only impediment to the development of the private attorney
general theory appeared when a suit based on alleged violations of
federal constitutional or statutory provisions was brought against
state officials. Although the officials were subject to injunctive or
declaratory relief,3" they argued that the award of attorney's fees,
albeit designed not as a punitive imposition but as a reward to the
plaintiff, was an impermissible remedy which violated the eleventh
amendment."
The eleventh amendment specifically bars a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction in a suit by a citizen against another state.31 In
addition, the amendment has been judicially extended to prohibit a
suit in federal court by an individual against his own state.3 The
subsequent opinion of Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974), the Court cited these
two cases and Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972), all of which had extended
the private attorney general theory to silent statutes, as evidence that desegregation
was of great national importance and that suits for that purpose were in the public
interest. Further, the Court summarily affirmed Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972), in which the silence of § 1983 was specifically
stated to be immaterial when the award was based on the private attorney general
theory. However, the Court has never explicitly adopted a position, see Lykken v.
Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 597 (D. Minn. 1973).
"See text accompanying note 45 infra.
31See, e.g., Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Undergraduate Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F.
Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1973);
Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970). Contra,Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d
646 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates
v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Perini, 359 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio
1973); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972); La Raza Uriida v. Volpe, 57
F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973) (no discussion of fees).
nFor the text of the amendment see note 5 supra. Arguably, the primary purpose
of the eleventh amendment is to protect a state's treasury from interference by the
federal judiciary, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) where the Court
stated: "Thus the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment." See also 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNrrED STATES
HIsToRY 99 (rev. ed. 1928). But see Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47
(1943) (amendment prevents interference with governmental processes); In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443 (1887) (amendment preserves state's dignity).
'The eleventh amendment was extended in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
The Court argued: "Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state
in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign
states, was indignantly repelled?" Id. at 15. Several commentators argue that the
holding in Hans is erroneous because the amendment was passed only to restrict the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore, federal question cases should
be heard regardless of a state's involvement. See Cullison, Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HOUSTON L. Rlv.
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eleventh amendment was passed in 1798 to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia" in which a citizen of South
Carolina was permitted to sue the named state. The dissent in the
case argued that a suit against a state was analogous to a suit against
the English Crown. Consequently, the permission of the state was a
prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction unless the state initiated the
suit.4 0 However, the majority in Chisholm rejected this contention
and held that article III of the Constitution4 was the definitive source
for determining the extent of a federal court's jurisdiction. Thus, the
Court held that it had the necessary power to hear a suit by a private
individual because article I did not specify that a state could come
before a federal court only as a party plaintiff.12 The amendment
explicitly altered the majority's construction and reinstated the common law concept of a state's sovereign immunity from suit.43
A means of circumventing the bar to the exercise of federal court
1 (1967); McCormack, IntergovernmentalImmunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51

N.C.L. REV. 485 (1973).
There is also a persistent controversy as to the proper interpretation of the Hans
extension. One argument is that the decision was based on the common law concept
of sovereign immunity, e.g., Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't., 411 U.S. 279,
313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47, 51 (1943). The opposing argument suggests that the extension is of constitutional
proportions either because a suit by an individual against his own state is implicitly
prohibited by the eleventh amendment, e.g., Employees v. Missouri Public Health
Dep't., 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (Douglas, J., majority opinion); Ex Parte New York, 256
U.S. 490, 497 (1921); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454 (E.D.
Pa. 1973); or because jurisdiction to entertain such suits was never conferred on the
courts by the terms of article I, e.g., Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't.,
411 U.S. 279, 291 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191,
1193 n.1 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974). See also Guthrie, The
Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitutionof the United States, 8 COLUM. L.
REv. 183 (1908); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2

GA. L. REv. 207 (1968).
Finally, several commentators advocate a compromise position in which Hans is
construed as having characteristics both of common law sovereign immunity and of a
constitutional mandate. See Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh AmendmentLower Court Interpretationsand the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473
(1973); Note, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Cm. L. REv.

331 (1966).
I'1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16 (1793).
"lId. at 25-26 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
§2 cl. 1 provides in part: "The judicial Power shall extend
"U.S. CONST. art. III,
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, .... -between a State and Citizens of another State;
' 2Chisholm v. Georgia, 1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 16, 39 (1793).
3
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton); McCormack, Intergovernmental
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485 (1973).
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jurisdiction44 contained in the eleventh amendment and its judicial5
extension was introduced by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Young.
The doctrine of this case enables a federal court to adjudicate a suit
against a state official in the narrow area of alleged violations of the
federal constitution. According to the theory of Young, if the officer
is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute or in excess of
"A second method used by the federal courts is a finding that a state has waived
the protection from suit embodied in the eleventh amendment and the Hans extension.
See, e.g., Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't., 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47
(1943); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970);
Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968).
See also Comment, Dawkins v. Craig: The-Eleventh Amendment and Suits for Retroactive Welfare Payments, 31 WASH.&LEE L. Rlv. 149 (1974); Comment, The Eleventh
Amendment Yields, 21 CATHoLIc U. L. REv. 163 (1971).
-209 U.S. 123 (1908).
4
The doctrine is based on an elaborate theory in which it is argued that the perfect
State is unable to commit a wrong or to authorize the commission of an illegal act.
Consequently, in a suit against an officer alleging unconstitutional conduct, the state
is a disinterested and'unaffected party. The officer may not impugn the state by using
its name as an authorization for his conduct. See Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 15960 (1908); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270, 290-91 (1885). See also Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the State: The
Doctrine and Some of Its Recent Developments, 40 MINN. L. REv. 234, 244-45 (1956).
The doctrine is clearly a fiction which circumvents the basic purpose of the eleventh amendment and enables a court to ignore the impact on the state in a suit against
its agents. See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalProtections,PartI, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974); Note, Suits
Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,59 HARv. L. REv.
1060 (1946).
Because the suit is brought to restrain the officer's actions pursuant to an allegedly
unconstitutional state statute, the court's decree at a minimum will interfere with the
administrative processes, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)
(district court may order board to levy taxes to finance school reopening). Inevitably,
compliance with the court's decree will entail substantial expenditures of state funds,
e.g., Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933
(1972) (board must spend $3,000,000 on equipment to bus students); Gates v. Collier,
349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (state required to make all necessary expenditures
to rectify unconstitutional prison conditions. The state complied by allocating an
initial sum of $3,000,000, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-5 (Supp. 1973), amending Miss.
ConE ANN.§ 47-5-5 (1971)); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(state must supply medical personnel in prisons); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (inadequate funding will not be an acceptable reason for failing to
improve conditions at state mental institutions). Since some effect is felt by the state
treasury, the subjective test becomes how much the court believes it can compel a state
to spend. While Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), has now drawn the line at
retrospective and prospective relief, the decision does not address the problem of how
much money a court can order a state to expend. See text accompanying notes 85-97
infra.
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his statutory authority, 7 he is deemed stripped of his official capacity
and concomitant immunity from suit. 8 The officer is also liable for
9
damages but only if he will be individually responsible for payment.
"TIn Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court held:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under
such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States.
209 U.S. at 159-60. Accord, In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
48
Although the Young opinion does not specifically restrict the available relief in
a suit against a state officer to an injunction or a declaratory judgment, the Court
apparently intended the remedies to be so limited. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949). See Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415,
420-21 (2d Cir. 1971); Frye v. Lukehard, 364 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Va. 1973).
4
The problem of an individual officer's liability for damages is particularly intricate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which authorizes a suit and a recovery of damages
only for acts in violation of the federal constitution or laws perpetrated "under color"
of state law. Therefore the defendants are usually state officers, but once they are
stripped of their official capacities under the Young doctrine, the jurisdictional bar of
the eleventh amendment may still be raised if the court determines that the request
for damages is actually directed against the state. In explaining the problem, the Tenth
Circuit stated:
The Civil Rights Act refers to "persons," but is restricted to acts
"under color" of state law, etc. Thus these "persons" must be, almost
without exception, state or local officials. However, under Ex parte
Young, they cannot be so acting or the action is barred under the
Eleventh Amendment. Their acts are thus enough beyond their proper
official functions to satisfy Ex parte Young, but still must be under
enough official "color" to come within the Civil Rights Act.
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342 (10th Cir. 1973). Accord, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (eleventh amendment
bars award because present defendant is a successor in office and damages are personal); Board of Trustees v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962
(1968). One court has determined that if the damage judgment itself does not bind the
state there is no eleventh amendment problem, thereby avoiding a determination of
whether the officer or the state will actually pay. Downs v. Department of Public
Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
In addition to the potential bar of the amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that the officer may raise the common law defense of official immunity. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court explained:
The concept of the immunity of government officers from personal
liability springs from the same root considerations that generated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . . This official immunity apparently rested . . . on two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability
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Conversely, if the remedy decreed is a monetary award which will be
paid directly from state funds, the state is adjudged the real, affected
party and
the eleventh amendment may be invoked to avoid the
5
award . 1
Courts, in order to differentiate between suits which were forbidden by the eleventh amendment and those which were permitted
under the Young doctrine, found that a test based on the "relief
requested" provided a workable line of demarcation." If injunctive or
an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to
exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability
would deter his willingness to execute his office ....
416 U.S. at 239-40 (footnotes omitted). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951);
Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972);
Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D. Me. 1970) (officers may assert good faith
defense and alternative attempt to hold them officially liable violates eleventh amendment). See generally C. AmIEAu, FEDERAL CVIL RGors AcTS: Crvmi PRAcTrE §§ 29-91
(1971). Note, A PracticalView of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473, 1488-90 (1973).
-Originally, the test developed to differentiate between suits against a state in
violation of the eleventh amendment and suits which were properly against an officer
depended on the parties named on the record, as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall
in Osborn v. The Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251, 277-78 (1824). However, in In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443 (1887), the Court determined that the proper test was to decide if, in
essence, the state was the party affected by the suit. For example, if the officer is sued
in his official capacity the suit is deemed to be one which is actually against the state,
e.g., Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (D.
Me. 1970). The doctrine of Ex Parte Young therefore requires that an officer be considered stripped of his official capacity to avoid an examination of the state's interest in
the suit. But see Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971), in which the court
held that officers, although sued in their official capacities, were amenable to the
injunctive and declaratory remedies thereby ignoring the fictions of the Young doctrine.
As finally formulated, the test to determine if the suit would affect a state was
most cogently stated in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945):
We have previously held that the nature of a suit as one against the
state is to be determined by the essential nature and effect of the
proceeding. And when the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even
though individual officials are nominal defendants.
Id. at 464 (citations omitted). Accord, Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Ex Parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 272 F.2d
337 (6th Cir. 1959).
51See Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 8 COLUM. L. Rav. 183, 200 (1908); Note, 7 GA. L. REv. 366 (1973).
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declaratory relief was sought, the suit was deemed to be against the
officer and thus within the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant
to Ex Parte Young." However, if monetary relief was requested, the
suit was actually against the state and the eleventh amendment
53
acted as a barrier to the exercise of a federal court's jurisdiction.
Thus, in a suit against a state officer, attorney's fees must be construed as relief which is permissible pursuant to the Young doctrine
to avoid a conflict with the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment.
In Sims v. Amos, 5 4 a three-judge court 5 for the Middle District of
Alabama determined that a claim of state sovereign immunity did
not inhibit its jurisdiction to make an award of attorney's fees. Consequently, the Sims court awarded fees against the state's Governor,
Attorney General, Secretary of State, and legislators predicated on
the private attorney general theory." Plaintiffs had effectuated a
strong congressional policy by securing a nondiscriminatory franchise
for the state's citizens. The complex litigation had not resulted in a
recovery, of damages, and the need for private enforcement was obvious since the defendants were those state officials responsible for a
proper legislative apportionment. 7 On the basis of the elements
enunciated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc.,"5 the court
held that fees should be awarded to the plaintiffs as private attorneys
general. The Sims court added the additional justification that
5

'See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952) (injunctive
and declaratory relief requested).
mSee, e.g., Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (suit for damages which would
be paid from state's treasury violates eleventh amendment).
51340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
-28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides in part:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the
action of any officer of such State . . . shall not be granted by any
district court. . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefor is heard . . . by a district court
of three judges ....
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the
decision of a three-judge district court.
'Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the court stated that
the silence of the statute as to an award of attorney's fees was immaterial, 340 F. Supp.
691, 695 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Accord, Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972);
Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F.
Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
57340 F. Supp. at 694-95.
-390 U.S. 400 (1968). See text accompanying notes 15-24 supra.
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"[an] award loses much of its discretionary character and becomes
a part of the effective remedy a court should fashion to encourage
public-minded suits . . ...,1Thus, the court not only construed attorney's fees to be a mandatory incentive award as established in
Newman, but determined that suits to protect federal rights under §
1983, despite the presence of state officials as defendants, were to be
encouraged.60
The Sims court's disposition of the claim of sovereign immunity
based on the eleventh amendment was less explicit than its discussion of attorney's fees. In a cryptic footnote to the opinion, the court
applied the classic Young doctrine reasoning that since the defendants had violated federal constitutional provisions they were
stripped of their representative capacity and the eleventh amendment could not be invoked to avoid the injunctive and declaratory
remedies.6 Without further explanation, the Sims court directed the
defendants to pay the fees which were, by implication, to come from
funds in the state treasury."z
11340 F. Supp. at 694.
"The court stated that the costs of securing injunctive relief were so high as to
create a barrier to important pro bono publico litigation which should be encouraged,
340 F. Supp. at 695. Accord, Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd,
493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
"The court stated:
Individuals who, as officers of a state, are clothed with some duty with
regard to a law of the state which contravenes the Constitution of the
United States, may be restrained by injunction, and in such a case the
state has no power to impart to its officers any immunity from such
injunction or from its consequences, including the court costs incident
thereto.
340 F. Supp. at 694 n.8.
2
It is not specifically stated in the opinion that payment was designated from the
state treasury. However, in their jurisdictional statement to the Supreme Court the
officials argued that the award of fees constituted a money judgment analogous to a
damage award against the state in contravention of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This statement was quoted in Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1973),
and referred to in Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1974), and in Taylor
v. Perini, 359 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Therefore, it would seem that
when the Sims court held the award permissible, it contemplated that it would be paid
from the state treasury.
The constitutional protection of the eleventh amendment immunizes a state from
suit in federal court, and consequently, no relief in any form may ever be granted
against the state. See note 50 supra.However, the federal courts have power under Ex
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Parte Young to award injunctive or declaratory relief against officers in their individual
capacities. See note 46 supra.In addition, a monetary judgment -naybe made against
officers as individuals if they are unable to assert a defense of good faith. See note 49
supra. Nevertheless, it may be inferred that the personal judgment is actually paid by
the state, and that the courts are aware of this fiction by which state funds are affected.
For example, in Gates v. Collier, the Fifth Circuit stated that attorney's fees could
have been awarded against the individual officers, "[I]n which event, of course,
everyone knows they would be 'bailed out' by the State." 489 F.2d 298, 302 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 79 infra. The policy arguments surrounding
an officer's defense of good faith also may be advanced to support the inference that a
state indemnifies its officials for personal judgments. Specifically, although caution or
restraint might be detrimental to public welfare, an officer will hesitate to exercise his
full authority if the possible result is personal monetary liability. See, e.g., Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974).
The court in Sims apparently discarded the subterfuge of a personal money judgment by permitting an officer to be sued in his official capacity, and awarding attorney's fees against him as a state official. See note 61 supra. Courts which have subsequently relied on Sims have utilized the opinion to eliminate one element of the Ex
Parte Young fiction, and have awarded attorney's fees against officers as state officials
rather than as individuals. This position was most strongly stated in Brandenburger
v. Thompson: "And an award of attorneys' fees assessed against a state official acting
in his or her official capacity is not proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. Sims v.
Amos, supra, 340 F. Supp., at 694 n.8." 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974). Accord, La
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703, 710 n.10 (M.D. Ala. 1972); cf. Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.
1971). See also note 67 infra. Thus, the good or bad faith of the defendant state officials
is immaterial since this defense is raised only to avoid a judgment imposing personal
liability. See note 49 supra, and 65 infra.
Two courts have taken the final step and, rather than awarding attorney's fees
against the defendant state officers as officials, have awarded the fees based on the
private attorney general theory directly from state funds. In Gates v. Collier the district court stated: "The award [of attorney's fees] herein shall not constitute the
personal, or individual, liability of the named defendants, or any of them, but they
are directed to pay same from funds which the Mississippi Legislature, at its 1973
Session, may appropriate for the operation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary." 371
F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973). In Taylor v.
Perini, the court rejected the defendant Attorney General's argument that the state
would not pay attorney's fees, and ordered him to initiate the procedure to obtain an
allocation by the Ohio legislature, 359 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Both
courts relied on the decision in Sims to support the direct imposition of attorney's fees
on state funds. Apparently these courts reasoned that if the crucial element of
Young-the fiction that the officer is individually before the court-had been discarded, then the fiction that a judgment will not affect state funds could also be
rejected.
Thus, Sims has been interpreted both broadly as permitting a direct levy against
state funds, and more restrictively as supporting an award against officers as state
officials. The latter interpretation preserves some aspect of the Young fiction because
it does not verbalize the fact that state funds are affected in a suit against officers as
officials. However, it is the thesis of this article that Sims supports a direct imposition
of attorney's fees on state funds, based on the private attorney general theory, and that
this holding was implicitly approved in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See
text accompanying note 85 infra.
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The Sims court's extensive analysis of the proper basis for an
award of attorney's fees suggests that it construed the fees as relief
which may be given consonant with the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
The court found that the defendant state officials could be charged
with the fees as a punitive award for acting in bad faith prior to and
during the course of the litigation. 3 A finding of conduct constituting
bad faith is a standard basis used by federal courts to shift fees, and
the purpose is to punish a party for uncooperative behavior by imposing the cost of attorney's fees as damages. 4 However, the Sims court
rejected this basis, choosing instead to reward the plaintiffs as private
attorneys general.6 " The court in Sims reasoned that unlike punitive
or compensatory damages, attorney's fees awarded under the private
attorney general theory did not violate the prohibition of the eleventh
amendment, but were an expense incidental to the injunctive relief. 6
The Sims court determined that if the state felt the effect of the
injunction issued pursuant to Young, it could also bear the cost of the
fees expended in obtaining the injunction, and was unable to invoke
the bar of the eleventh amendment to avoid the award. 7
11340 F. Supp. at 694.
"See note 1 supra.
"The Sims court stated: "Nevertheless, a finding of bad faith is not always a
prerequisite to the taxing of attorneys' fees against defendants, and in this case, despite the availability of that ground, the Court has decided to base its award on far
broader considerations of equity." 340 F. Supp. at 694 (footnote omitted).
"See note 61 supra.
'Support for this interpretation of Sims can be derived from that court's citation
to Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971). In Williams, the Tenth Circuit
entertained a suit against state officials, designated in their official capacities, for
injunctive and declaratory relief. Although the technicalities of the style of the case
caption should not be significant, a suit against officers as state officials is necessarily
violative of the eleventh amendment because it does not conform to the fictions dictated by the Young doctrine whereby an officer must be "stripped" of his representative capacity for purposes of federal jurisdiction. See notes 49 and 50 supra. The
Williams court did, however, reject plaintiff's request for punitive and compensatory
damages. The court reasoned that because the officers were sued officially, the damages would be paid from state, rather than from individual, funds and that this imposition was prohibited by the eleventh amendment. 443 F.2d at 428-29. Logically, if the
damages request was denied on the basis of the amendment, the court should also have
analyzed the injunctive and declaratory remedies as an attempt to coerce the state.
Arguably, by permitting the plaintiff to sue the officers in their official capacities, the
Williams court recognized that a state is affected by the injunctive relief issued against
its agents. See note 46 supra.But the Tenth Circuit stated that because of the eleventh
amendment, a federal court does not have the jurisdiction to subject a state to an
award of damages. Thus, a state is involved in a suit against its agents but, absent
consent, may be affected only to the extent of the declaratory and injunctive remedies.
If this interpretation of the analysis in Williams is correct, then an inference may
be drawn concerning the reasoning of the Sims court. Since attorney's fees under the
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The cases which have subsequently relied on Sims have also characterized attorney's fees as an incentive device which is proper relief
in a suit initiated under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young." Consequently, any discussion of the eleventh amendment has been brief,
and the assumption has been made that once an officer is before the
court, fees can be charged against the state treasury."9 None of the
cases offers a clear explication of Sims, but a combined reading of
several suggests that the earlier case established two propositions:
first, after a federal court has obtained jurisdiction over the defendant state officials, its equitable power to shift fees is impeded neither by the eleventh amendment nor by the doctrine of Ex Parte
Young; second, jurisdiction over defendant state officials enables a
court, dependent only upon the quality of the assessment," to impose
on state funds.
The first proposition was articulated in La Raza Unida v. Volpe7
in which the private attorney general theory was extended to the 1966
Department of Transportation Act,7 2 a statute which is silent regarding an award of attorney's fees. The La Raza court concluded that
the criteria outlined in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc."
which made a fee shift based on the private attorney general theory
mandatory in the absence of special circumstances, were present to
support the extension. Yet, rather than incorporating this mandatory
aspect, the La Raza court relied solely on its equitable discretion to
shift attorney's fees, presumably in an attempt to preserve its ability
to deny the fee request. 4 The La Raza court's ultimate decision to
exercise its discretion and award fees in favor of the plaintiff suggests
private attorney general theory are not construed as damages, the fees can be levied
against the officers in their official capacities in conjunction with the declaratory and
injunctive relief which is permissible under the Ex Parte Young fiction. See note 62
supra. But see Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1973), where the
court reasoned that because the officials could assert a defense of good faith, attorney's
fees would be paid from state rather than from individual funds, and were therefore
damages prohibited by the eleventh amendment and by the rationale of Williams.
"See Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier,
489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Taylor v. Perini, 359 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp.
703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
"See Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Perini, 359 F. Supp.
1185 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Contra,Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974); Skehan
v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).
'See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
7157 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
7249 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
71390 U.S. 400 (1968); see text accompanying note 15 supra.
757 F.R.D. at 99, 101.
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75
that no special circumstances intervened to preclude the award.
Because all the necessary factors for rewarding plaintiffs as private attorneys general were present in La Raza, the only circumstance which might have precluded a fee shift was the position of the
defendants as state officials. 7 Actually, the court need not have discussed the problem potentially presented by the eleventh amendment because California has a statutory provision for defending and
indemnifying state officials. 77 Nonetheless, in a footnote to the opinion in which the court examined the scope of its jurisdiction, Sims v.
Amos was held to govern the decision.7 8 The court in La Raza reasoned that once its jurisdiction had been properly invoked pursuant
to the Young doctrine, the officers could not later interpose the eleventh amendment to frustrate the shift of attorney's fees. In sum, the
court held that jurisdiction over the main action enabled it to exercise
its power to grant the request for attorney's fees as an inevitable
expense of litigation.
The second proposition attributed to Sims, that once a court has
jurisdiction over state officials the quality of the award is the determinative factor in a decision to charge state funds, was propounded
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gates v. Collier.7" The Fifth

"See note 22 supra.
"The La Raza court stated: "We cannot emphasize enough that in granting this
motion [for attorney's fees], the purpose is not to saddle the losing party with the
financial burden in order to punish him, rather we shift the financial burden in order
to effectuate a strong Congressional policy." 57 F.R.D. at 102. Accord, Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Since the court in La Raza cited Sims
for the propositions that a finding of bad faith was unnecessary, and that a federal
court has jurisdiction to award fees from state funds when the private attorney general
theory is the basis, the case supports the suggestion that Sims construed fees as
permissible relief under Ex Parte Young, see note 67 supra.
"CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1974), amending CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 825
(West 1966). The statute explicitly disallows indemnification for exemplary or punitive
damages, yet the court in La Raza did not hesitate to award fees against the officers
based on the private attorney general theory.
1157 F.R.D. at 101-02 n.11.
71489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973). The initial problem in analyzing Gates is to determine which theory was used to support the award of attorney's fees. The district court
was presented with both the bad faith theory and the private attorney general theory
and chose the former, 371 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (N.D. Miss. 1973). The Fifth Circuit
ostensibly adopted this standard, 489 F.2d 298, 300 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973). However, the
circuit court then noted that the private attorney general theory was available to
support the award. The court also stated that the attorney's fees were not assessed as
damages to punish the defendants, which is the rationale for fee shifting under the bad
faith theory. Finally, the court relied on the decision in La Raza in which the private
attorney general theory was used. It is reasonable to conclude that the Fifth Circuit
actually based the award on the private attorney general theory. See Yelverton v.
Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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Circuit began its analysis with the supposition that an officer sued
under the Young fiction may be subjected to a personal monetary
judgment. The Gates court reasoned, however, this ostensibly personal judgment would inevitably be paid by the state so that the cost
to the state was the same whether the damages were assessed directly
against it or against its agents.80 The court in Gates determined that
the power to award fees directly from state funds was unimpaired
either by the defendants' official position or by the eleventh amendment.8' This decision was based partially on the opinion in La Raza
which held that once officials were before the court, it had jurisdiction to adjudicate both the substantive questions and the request for
fees. In addition, the court in Gates decided that Sims v. Amos supported an independent analytic approach to the problem in which the
characterization of the award was determinative in deciding whether
or not the eleventh amendment was violated by the imposition on
state funds.8" The court concluded that because of the inherent quality of attorney's fees under the private attorney general theory, they
should be categorized as permissible relief under Ex Parte Young
rather than as unacceptable relief under the eleventh amendment.
The Fifth Circuit stated that fees were not to be construed as damages but as an essential aspect of a plaintiffs relief pursuant to the
injunctive or declaratory remedy, and as an incentive device to encourage similar suits.83 The decision in Gates thereby established that
attorney's fees under the private attorney general theory could be
charged directly from state funds as a proper exercise of the court's
jurisdiction under Ex Parte Young. Such a fee award did not violate
the eleventh amendment because it constituted an integral part of
the injunctive relief allowable under Young.
The analysis in these two cases aids in clarifying the rationale
used in Sims. In the usual suit against a state officer under the Young
fiction, the official is amenable to injunctive relief which often has a
significant impact on the state treasury. A state's liability in such a
suit is thus no greater than if the suit were directly against the state. 4
However, a specific request for a monetary award which will be paid
directly from the state treasury violates the eleventh amendment and
the prohibited relief may therefore be constitutionally barred. Attor8See note 49 supra.

"1489 F.2d at 302.
"See text accompanying note 63 supra.

11489 F.2d at 302.
"See note 46 supra.
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ney's fees under the private attorney general theory, however, are not
an additional award but represent a natural consequence of the litigation similar to monies expended to comply with an injunction. Essentially, the Sims court determined that the status of the defendants
as officers was not an intervening special circumstance as discussed
in Newman, which inhibited the mandatory exercise of the power to
award fees. The policies surrounding the private attorney general
theory therefore could be implemented without violating the eleventh
amendment. In addition, because attorney's fees predicated on the
private attorney general theory are not characterized as damages, the
award comes within the category of permissible relief under Ex Parte
Young.
In Edelman v. Jordan,81 the Supreme Court re-examined the kind
of relief available in suits under the Young doctrine and carefully
preserved the traditional protection afforded a state by the eleventh
amendment. The plaintiff in Edelman sued officials of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid under § 1983 alleging violations of the
federal-state program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD). 86As part of the declaratory and injunctive relief requested,
the plaintiff sought a retroactive award of wrongfully withheld welfare payments. The Court refused the retroactive award and held that
in suits under Ex Parte Young only prospective injunctive relief was
available. The Court in Edelman determined that a state, in a suit
against its agents, could not be subjected to the payment of damages.87 In the context of attorney's fees it is crucial to determine the
exact delineation which the Court made between the injunctive relief
available under Young and the remedies constituting damages prohibited by the eleventh amendment.
The Edelman Court began its analysis by emphasizing that the
primary purpose of the eleventh amendment was to afford protection
to a state's treasury. This protection could not be lessened without
the state's express consent, and suits by private individuals were
5415 U.S. 651 (1974).
"This program, funded equally by the state and federal governments, enabled a
state to provide financial and medical assistance to specified categories of persons who
were aged, blind or disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). The state was required to submit
an assistance plan for approval by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
which administered the funds pursuant to regulations, including stipulations as to the
time in which an individual's application for aid was to be processed, and payment
was to begin. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973). As of January 1, 1974, the entire program
was revised. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 1H, 1973).
"415 U.S. at 668-69.
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therefore prohibited if the result would impose upon state funds.8
Having reiterated these fundamental principles, the Court sought to
determine the extent to which Ex Parte Young encroached upon the
state's protection noting, however, that "the difference between the
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted
under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day
and night."89 The Court analyzed the factual setting in Young,"° and
determined that in suits under that doctrine only the same relief-a
prospective injunction-was available.' However, the Court recognized that even in the original case of Ex Parte Young some impact
was had on the treasury since the state was unable to collect the fines
it had prescribed under the contested statute.2 On this basis, the
Edelman Court held that a monetary effect on the state treasury is
permissible, but only when an increased expenditure would be necessary, in the future, for compliance with the terms of a prospective
3
decree.
The Court then analyzed the award of retroactive welfare paymId. at 660-63. The Court was responding to the novel theory advanced by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the potential liability of the state treasury was
not the proper measure of the eleventh amendment's applicability. Jordan v. Weaver,
472 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
"415 U.S. at 667.
9
°I
n the original case of Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), railroad shareholders
sued the Attorney General of Minnesota to restrain enforcement of a state statute
setting maximum rates which the railroads could charge, alleging that the rates were
confiscatory and thus in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Attorney General
disobeyed the district court's injunction by commencing suit in state court and was
held in contempt. He then applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus
but the Court held that the injunction to prevent threatened court action was proper.
"Again, the Edelman Court was responding to the argument advanced by the
Seventh Circuit that "[tihere is nothing in Ex parte Young which delimits the relief
a district court can give notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment in a case which
comes before it in a different posture." Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir.
1973), rev'd sub nom., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
1415 U.S. at 667.
"Id. at 668. The Court was very specific in describing the kind of expenditure
which was permissible:
State officials, in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate
of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend money from
the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury
is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle
announced in Ex Parte Young. ...
In Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974), the court construed attorney's fees to
be a permissible ancillary effect on the state treasury as defined in Edelman.
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ments involved in Edelman to determine if it fell within the category
of prospective relief. The Seventh Circuit had characterized the payments as equitable restitution" but the Supreme Court rejected this
denomination stating that the award amounted to a levy of damages
against the state because "[ilt is measured in terms of a monetary
loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the
defendant state officials." 95 Applying this test the Court reasoned
that the payments were actually compensatory rather than remedial
because the time elapsed between initial deprivation and courtordered repayment indicated that they would not alleviate the plaintiffs present condition but would be a reimbursement for past violations. Moreover, the defendants could not be punished for failure to
comply because their conduct pursuant to the state procedures had
never been judicially determined to be violative of the federal regulations. The Court consequently construed the payments as a punitive
award against the defendants for failure to meet the federal time
limits for processing applications." Thus, damage payments were an
impermissible extension of the relief available in a suit based on Ex
Parte Young rather than an integral part of the injunctive impact on
the state and consequently contravened the eleventh amendment.
The decision in Edelman seemingly establishes the line between
monetary effects on the state treasury which will inevitably result
from an application of Ex Parte Young, and those encroachments
which raise the prohibition of the eleventh amendment even if state
officers are nominally the defendants." The Court in Edelman determined that an injunction under the Young doctrine was proper as
were any expenditures related to the injunction. 9 However, if the
plaintiff seeks compensation for the earlier violations rather than
suing state officers to compel adherence to applicable federal constitutional or statutory mandates, the suit violates the state's sovereign
immunity under the eleventh amendment. The most important result of the Edelman decision is the flexibility with which the line was
established. Rather than categorically denying all monetary effects
on the treasury, the Court recognized and condoned the realities of a
suit under Ex Parte Young. Pursuant to that doctrine some monetary
disbursements would have to be made from the treasury, but an
award related to past violations constituted damages under the test
"Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973).
11415 U.S. at 668.
"Id. at 664-66 & n.11.
"See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
"See note 93 supra.
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enunciated by the Court and was impermissible.9 Thus the Edelman
Court fully preserved the protection of the eleventh amendment by
declaring that a state should never be subjected to punitive payments
at the demand of private individuals, yet maintained the Young doctrine as a viable tool by which individuals could correct unconstitutional conduct on the part of state officials.
With respect to the awarding of attorney's fees the decision in
Edelman has been construed to foreclose any award of money to be
paid from state funds, rather than as permitting some limited monetary effect on the treasury under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. Both
the Third'00 and Sixth 1 ' Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded
that Edelman restricted the standard test of the "relief requested"
to a precise injunctive-monetary dichotomy. 0 2 Thus, the courts determined that only injunctive or declaratory remedies were available in
suits against state officials, although in both cases the request for
attorney's fees was predicated on the presence of the three criteria for
implementation of the private attorney general theory. Therefore, if
the construction placed on the Edelman decision by these courts is
correct, suits in which the plaintiff confronts state officials and effectuates a strong congressional policy will be deterred. 3 This result is
evidenced by the rejection, by both circuits, of the decision in Sims
which held that suits vindicating an important congressional policy
9

T'he Court stated that the retroactive welfare payments were, in actuality, an

award of damages directly against the state in contravention of the eleventh amendment. The test promulgated by the Court to differentiate between acceptable relief
against a state officer under Ex ParteYoung, and unacceptable relief directed against
the state has two bases. The time element is the first portion of the test since the Court
stated that only future expenditures in compliance with the terms of a decree came
within the category of relief pursuant to the Young doctrine. The second portion of the
test is directed to a determination of the quality of the award because the Court
rejected any attempt to compensate the plaintiff as in essence a damage recovery. The
two-pronged test is illustrated by the Court's criticism of the retroactive welfare award:
It requires payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation to those whose applications
were processed on the slower time schedule at a time when petitioner
was under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard.
415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974). Although the Court analyzed the welfare payments as damages and disallowed them, it nonetheless recognized that a state could be forced to
expend monies in a suit ostensibly against its officers under Ex Parte Young, see note
93 supra.
'®Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).
"'Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974).
1°2See text accompanying notes 51-53 and notes 97-99 supra.
"'See notes 3-4 supra.

1975]

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

should be encouraged by a fee award under the private attorney1 0gen4
eral theory despite the presence of state officials as defendants.
In the first case, Skehan v. Board of Trustees,'15 the Third Circuit
held that an award of attorney's fees from the state treasury was
prohibited by the eleventh amendment. The case was remanded for
a determination of the defendants' status under Pennsylvania law,
but the court decided that if the state institution enjoyed sovereign
immunity, no attorney's fees could be assessed against it. The-Third
Circuit based its holding on Edelman, reasoning that although the
Supreme Court had not discussed attorney's fees, the rationale of the
opinion nonetheless foreclosed any monetary award from state
funds.' 0 Should the defendants not be immune, however, the Skehan
court stated that the private attorney general theory might be considered as the proper basis on which to award fees.' 7 Thus, this decision
suggests that, in a case in which the officials enjoy immunity, even
the private attorney general theory constitutes an improper damage
award in violation of the eleventh amendment.
To support its conclusion that an award of attorney's fees could
not be made from a state's treasury, the Skehan court argued that
the earlier case of Sims had been overruled, although through inadvertence it was not specifically mentioned' 8 by the Supreme Court's
decision in Edelman. In reaching its conclusion, the Skehan court
discussed neither of the two propositions advanced by the Sims court:
that jurisdiction over the state officials pursuant to Young enabled a
court to award fees; and that the characterization of the fees as an
incentive avoided the eleventh amendment prohibition.' Moreover,
the Skehan court did not discuss or apply the test developed in the
Edelman decision for distinguishing prohibited damages from a
permissible monetary effect on the treasury pursuant to Ex Parte
Young."' Instead, the Skehan court referred to a nebulous "rationale" in the Edelman opinion which forbade any monetary imposition
on state funds. Apparently the court in Skehan concluded that the
Supreme Court's holding, in which only prospective injunctive de-

"'See text accompanying note 54 supra.
11 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).
"'Id.at 42 n.7.
at 44.
111d. at 42 n.7. This argument seems unfounded since the Edelman Court specifically discussed and overruled four cases in which awards of retroactive welfare payments were summarily affirmed, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 & n.13 (1974).
' See text accompanying notes 71 and 79 supra.
"'See note 99 supra.
1'Id.
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crees were permitted, precluded a more detailed examination of the
financial consequences attendant upon such decrees.
The Supreme Court decision in Edelman was also construed to
prohibit a fee award from state funds by the Sixth Circuit in Jordon
v. Gilligan."' However, unlike the Skehan court, the Sixth Circuit
considered and rejected the propositions relating to jurisdiction and
to the characterization of the fee award which were developed in the
pre-Edelman cases. The Gilligan court determined that although
suits against state officers seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
were properly within the jurisdiction of a federal court, a request for
a monetary award to be paid from state funds deprived the court of
jurisdiction to the extent of making the award. The Sixth Circuit held
therefore, contrary to the pre-Edelman cases,"12 that attorney's fees
could not be awarded in conjunction with the available remedies
under Ex Parte Young, and granted the motion by defendant state
officials to vacate the district court's award of attorney's fees as a void
judgment.
To support its rejection of the two pre-Edelman propositions, the
Sixth Circuit relied on the argument advanced in Skehan that Sims,
in which the two theories were first suggested, had been overruled.
To this extent the two circuits were in agreement for they both held
that even if a federal court had previously been able to shift fees, after
the Edelman decision the eleventh amendment presented a complete
bar to an award of attorney's fees from state funds. However, the two
courts diverged in their interpretation of the basis on which the
Edelman holding barred recovery of fees. The Skehan court held that
the Supreme Court decision foreclosed all monetary awards so that
no further inquiry was necessary."' Conversely, the Gilligan court
recognized that the Edelman decision, having promulgated a test
designed to differentiate between permissible non-damage awards
and impermissible monetary relief, dictated an additional qualitative
"'500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974).
"'The Sixth Circuit declined to follow the holding in La Raza, that jurisdiction
over the main action pursuant to the Young doctrine enabled a federal court to assess
attorney's fees from state funds, arguing that the decision was based on the California
indemnity statute. 500 F.2d at 708. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the decision in Gates that the characterization of
the fee award was one factor in a decision to assess fees from the state treasury. See
text accompanying note 82 supra. The Gilligan court stated: "Whether an award of
attorneys' fees differs from an award of damages seems to us to be irrelevant ....
"
500 F.2d at 708. Such a statement appears to be inconsistent with the Gilligancourt's
subsequent recognition and application of the test devised in Edelman to distinguish
damage awards from permissible Young relief. See note 114 infra.
"'See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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analysis of attorney's fees. Therefore, the court in Gilligan applied
the test to fees and determined that they were impermissible damages in contravention of the eleventh amendment, which were given
because the defendant state officials had violated a previous duty."'
If the result of the opinion in Edelman v. Jordan has been to
clarify the traditional "relief requested" test by establishing the line
of demarcation not upon a strict injunctive-monetary dichotomy but
instead upon the more flexible measure which differentiates between
an injunction together with its related financial consequences, and a
monetary imposition on state funds which is punitively oriented, then
the characterization of attorney's fees is the controlling factor in determining whether a federal court has the necessary jurisdiction to
award fees against state officials. Thus, if the attorney's fees are
construed as damages designed to punish the officers and through
them the state, the eleventh amendment principle of protection for
a state's treasury precludes an award. Officers may be compelled to
conform their behavior to applicable federal constitutional or statutory requirements, but the state may not be punished for their past
failure to do so. Conversely, if the award of fees is characterized as a
reward to the plaintiff and as an incentive device to encourage future
suits vindicating federal constitutional or statutory rights, as in Sims,
the fee shift is permissible under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. Further, the award is mandatory rather than discretionary because the
status of the officer is not a special circumstance which intervenes to
deprive the court of jurisdiction to make the award. Alternatively, if
the opinion in Edelman is construed as a precise reiteration of the
"relief requested" test so that only injunctive relief is permitted in a
'The court in Gilligan stated:
Although appellees urge that attorneys' fees are analogous to costs,
the taxing of which is permitted against states, the test for determining whether a particular type of relief passes muster, as set out in
Edelman, indicates the opposite. The Amendment bars any award
which is "[m]easured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a
past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials."
In our opinion, awards of attorneys' fees fall within
Edelman ....
that classification and are, therefore, barred.
500 F.2d at 709-10 (footnotes omitted). The Gilligan court was specifically presented
with a request for fees based on the private attorney general theory and stated that its
refusal to allow the fees would not significantly inhibit the kind of litigation meant to
be encouraged by the award. This is obviously unrealistic since one of the premises
for the theory is the need for private enforcement of congressional or constitutional
mandates which often involves an examination of the conduct of state officials, e.g.,
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp.
949 (D. Hawaii 1972).
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suit under Ex Parte Young, then the court in Skehan correctly forbade all monetary impositions as violative of the eleventh amendment.
In Edelman, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged that the
Young doctrine, although ostensibly a device enabling federal courts
to examine official conduct, can result in a significant financial impact on the state treasury." 5 The thrust of the opinion was therefore
aimed at defining the quality and scope of this effect on state funds.
Narrowly stated, the question posed by the Court was what kind of
expenditures are consistent with the doctrine of Ex Parte Young and
what kind of impositions conflict with the eleventh amendment. The
Edelman Court's solution was to permit a financial impact incidental
to the injunctive relief rather than to deny all monetary impositions." 6
The Court began its analysis by juxtaposing its earlier decisions
in Ex Parte Young and in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury."' In the former case, the paramount relief was an injunction designed to alter the future conduct of state officials. As an
ancillary result of this prospective relief, the state was deprived of the
potential fines provided for in the statute which the official was now
forbidden to enforce. Conversely, in Ford the plaintiff sought reimbursement for tax monies paid into the state treasury pursuant to an
allegedly unconstitutional statute."8 Therefore, the primary purpose
of the suit was to recover money and an adjudication of the constitutionality of the state statute was an excuse for obtaining reimbursement.
The Edelman Court then applied these two fact situations to the
case before it and determined that plaintiff's request for retroactive
welfare payments was analogous to the reimbursement sought and
denied in Ford. The Court in Edelman reasoned that in both cases
the request for monies in the treasury was an attempt to receive
compensation from the state for past violations by its officers and was
thereby a request for damages. Rather than overrule Ford, the Court
concluded that the retroactive welfare payments were to be denied
as a direct imposition on the state treasury in violation of the eleventh amendment."' The Edelman Court therefore held that only expenditures which are "[a] necessary result of compliance with de"5See text accompanying note 89 supra.
"'See note 93 supra.

"7323 U.S. 459 (1945).
"Id. at 460.

'415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974).
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crees which by their terms [are] prospective .
0 may be ordered
paid from state funds consistently with the Young doctrine. The result of the Edelman decision is that awards qualitatively analogous
to damages may never be given, and that a federal court may only
order a state to expend funds prospectively.
Although fees awarded under the private attorney general theory
are not expended in compliance with prospective decrees, neither are
they retrospective relief. Rather, they arise concurrently with the
issuance of the injunction. However, while the Edelman decision
emphasizes the time element in a determination of permissible relief
under Ex Parte Young, the quality of the relief is also an important
consideration. Under the private attorney general theory, the fees are
not designed as damages to compensate the plaintiff for past harm
but are an attempt to reallocate the cost of the suit as an expense
incidental to obtaining the injunctive relief. 2' The fees also serve as
an incentive device to encourage future plaintiffs by assuring them
that they will not be forced to bear the expense of a legitimate suit
in the public interest.2' Actually, since the general public is benefitted by a suit under the private attorney general theory, charging the
award against the state treasury essentially spreads the cost of the
suit among the taxpayers who are the ultimate beneficiaries.'2
The character of an award under the private attorney general
theory is best illustrated by its sharp contrast to another theory used
by the courts to shift fees, called the "bad faith" rationale, in which
a party's conduct provides the basis for an award." 4 For example, if
the defendant is found to have acted vexatiously or wantonly prior
to or during the course of the litigation, fees are shifted to him as a
means of punishment for his disruptive conduct. Fees will also be
shifted as a punitive imposition if the defendant fails to comply
promptly with subsequent court orders.' 25 Conversely, the private at1'2Id. at 668.
"'See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Jinks v. Mays,
350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala.
1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971).
'1See Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation, 33 Mn. L. REv. 379 (1973).
l'nSee, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 718-19 (1974); National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See also Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public
Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 301 (1973); Note, The Allocation of Attorney's
Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CH. L. REV. 316 (1971).
"'See note 1 supra.
"'See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
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torney general theory does not emphasize characteristics of the particular plaintiff or defendant but is based on factors relating to the
broader setting of the suit such as the benefit derived, the need for
private enforcement, and the importance of the congressional policies
which have been vindicated by the suit. Therefore, fees predicated on
the private attorney general theory seem to meet both the time and
quality requirements specified in the Edelman opinion to determine
the permissible monetary effect of a suit under Ex Parte Young.
In Sims v. Amos, the private attorney general theory and the
mandatory nature of the award were construed as an important tool
which enabled private parties to supervise the actions of public officials. Yet this need to shift fees conflicted with the defendant officers'
argument that the eleventh amendment prohibited such an award
and that the state treasury was not a source of funds directly available to the court. The Sims court's alternative was to interpret the
holding in Ex Parte Young to provide that a state could not immunize
its officials from the effects of an injunction including the expense
incurred in obtaining it. Essentially, the court in Sims held that a
federal court's jurisdiction under the Young doctrine also gave it the
power to affect state funds directly, rather than covertly through an
injunction mandating a monetary expenditure.126 According to the
Sims court, the only restriction on this exercise of jurisdiction was the
quality of the award.' 27 Thus, the eleventh amendment was interpreted as a prohibition against an assessment of damages rather than
as a complete bar to a federal court's ability to reach into a state's
treasury. The Court in Edelman implicitly approved of the decision
in Sims since both opinions recognized and permitted an imposition
on state funds under Ex Parte Young. In addition, the Edelman
opinion clarified when such an imposition could occur by providing
a test, based on the dual factors of time and quality, delineating
permissible and impermissible relief under Young."'2 A federal court
could exercise its jurisdiction and make an award from the treasury
only if it did not constitute damages. 2'
1'2 See note 61 supra.
'See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
"'See note 99 supra.
"'The Supreme Court has subsequently cited Edelman for the proposition "that
the doctrine of Ex parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking damages from the
public treasury ....
" Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (emphasis added).
This statement may support the suggestion that the Edelman opinion did not foreclose
all monetary awards from a state's treasury but recognized the inevitable effect on the
state in a suit under the Young doctrine, and determined that the characterization of
the award is a crucial factor in the decision to charge state funds.
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The decisions in Skehan and Gilligan seemingly misconstrued the
implications of Edelman and consequently refused to award fees on
the basis of the private attorney general theory. Skehan held that any
monetary award from the state treasury was forbidden by the Supreme Court decision. Yet the Edelman opinion specifically recognized that an imposition would have to be made on state funds to
fulfill the injunctive mandate. Attorney's fees awarded on the private
attorney general theory are a reasonable outgrowth of the issuance of
the injunction and may be granted commensurate with a federal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over defendant state officials. Further,
the Skehan court partially predicated its holding on the assumption
that Sims was intended to be overruled. But the Sims decision is still
viable and provides support for the proposition that fees under the
private attorney general theory may be assessed from the treasury in
connection with a suit under Young without violating the eleventh
amendment.
Despite its apparent reliance on the decision in Skehan, the court
in Gilligan was unconvinced that all monetary awards were broadly
prohibited, for it recognized the test developed in Edelman. However,
the court failed to apply the test properly because it did not make
the requisite factual inquiry to determine if the fees were punitively
awarded and therefore qualitatively analogous to damages. Instead,
the Gilligan court merely quoted the test and held that fees were
damages which a federal court did not have jurisdiction to award
from a state's treasury.' 30 Yet, the private attorney general theory
does not contemplate the award as a punitive imposition but as indemnification to the plaintiff for the expense of a suit in the public
interest.
Although the decision in Sims was only summarily affirmed by
the Supreme Court, the subsequent decision in Edelman can be interpreted as having accepted the theories of the earlier case. Essentially,
the Court has acknowledged the realities of a suit against a state
officer and has explicitly delineated the extent of the impact to which
a state may be subjected in a suit against its agents. While the protections embodied in the eleventh amendment have been affected no
more than they were by the original Ex Parte Young decision, the
federal courts, in an acceptable exercise of jurisdiction, may now
assess fees from state funds as a remedy ancillary to the injunctive
relief.'13 Yet, the limitation on the monetary impact is designed to
prohibit impositions which are analogous to damages thereby pro'1See note 114 supra.
"'See Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1974).
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tecting the state from frivolous suits. Ultimately the state will expend
no more in complying with an injunctive decree than it did before the
Edelman decision. Further, permissible and impermissible suits may
still be differentiated on the basis of the "relief requested" test, but
the monetary-injunctive dichotomy has been realigned to permit the
courts to focus on the kind of expenditure a state may be compelled
to make in compliance with the injunction.
Applying this more realistic and sophisticated test, attorney's fees
awarded to a private attorney general should be a permissible imposition on state funds. The fees are neither damages under the qualitative aspect of the test which forbids a punitive imposition nor are they
unacceptably retroactive. Rather the fees arise concurrently with the
injunction and are a reward to the plaintiff for seeking and obtaining
such relief. Finally, in a suit by a private individual, or in one which
is financed by a public interest organization, the implementation of
a strong congressional policy should weigh favorably in the balance
and the award should be mandatory regardless of the presence of
state officials as defendants.'32
DEBORAH J. SUSMAN

3
' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has subsequently reversed and remanded
Taylor v. Perini, No. 73-2071 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1974) (slip opinion). The majority held
that the eleventh amendment barred an award of attorney's fees against the State of
Ohio. If, on remand, the defendant state officer was found to be personally liable for
attorney's fees, the private attorney general theory was the proper basis for the award.
Id. at 8-10. See note 62 supra.
However, the dissent argued that although the state would pay the award, the
officer should be held liable for attorney's fees in his official capacity. Id. at 14. The
summary affirmance of Sims v. Amos was controlling, and permitted a fee award
against an officer in his official capacity despite an eleventh amendment defense. Id.
at 15-18. In addition, the decision in Edelman v. Jordan permitted a financial impact
on the state treasury in a suit against officials for prospective injunctive relief. Id. at
18. Unlike damages or retroactive welfare payments, attorney's fees were a permissible
ancillary remedy to the injunction and could be awarded in an acceptable exercise of
a federal court's jurisdiction over the main action. Id. at 19-20. See text accompanying
notes 78, 83, and 131 supra.

